INTRODUCTION
The design of prudential regulations which ensure effective monitoring of systemic risk and limit the spread of contagion between financial institutions involves the identification of systemically important institutions. Distinguishing them is a constant topic of debate among supervisory authorities as their collapse could significantly affect the whole financial system due to the propagation of negative externalities. Moreover, special prudential regulations should be applied to these banks.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision developed a framework to identify global systemically important banks (GSIBs) considering their size, interconnectedness, complexity, substitutability and global activity (BCBS, 2014) . The European Banking Authority proposed the term global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) stressing their interconnectedness as a major factor by which they should be included in this list (EBA, 2014) . According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008) , financial institutions should be classified in this category only to the extent that their collapse transmits negative externalities to the whole economy. Although there is not yet a widespread agreement on what constitutes systemically important institution, all the definitions and regulations issued by the supervisory authorities focus on the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) paradigm.
A significant strand of literature assesses the probability of occurrence of a liquidity crisis to cause damage to the entire banking system due to particular massive cash withdrawals (Andries et al., 2012; 2015) . The basis of the studies that examine the link between the level of liquidity and bank fragility in the event of massive withdrawals of deposits before maturity is designed by the famous model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Since then, a series of models propose improvements to the original one. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) examined the sensitivity of banking contracts to the information asymmetry regarding future performance of the banks. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) , as well as Allen and Gale (2000) developed models that are based on customers' liquidity needs and banks' ability to exploit long-term financed investment projects, given the possibility of borrowing on the interbank market.
Alongside, a number of models that assess the interbank market contagion and the anticipated massive withdrawals of deposits have been developed: Gale (1998, 2000) , Chen (1999) , Rochet and Tirole (1996a) , Freixas et al. (1999) , Freixas and Holthausen (2005) , Rochet and Vives (2004) . Also, with the intensification of contagion in the financial system after the collapse of Lehman Brothers financial supervisory authorities have reiterated attention towards basic guidelines of the Diamond-Dybvig model. Important contributions to the literature on interbank contagion are found in Rochet and Tirole (1996b), Allen and Gale (2000) , and, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) . Contracts that are based on interbank loans expose banks to counterparty default risk. Due to tight connections between financial institutions, but also because of common exposures to certain risk factors, contagion in the interbank market may generate some of the most severe adverse effects both at the level of the national economy and also internationally. The situation is even more severe when large value loans are granted without appropriate collateral, both quantitative and qualitative.
Considering this background the aim of our paper is to investigate the exposure to systemic risk of "too-big-to-fail" banks. Using a sample of top ten European banks by total assets at the debut of the most recent financial crisis we assess the contagion effects during 2008-2010 by employing the Conditional Value at Risk methodology. This implies to estimate the probability that a bank will face a drop in its market value of total assets in stressed periods due to the reduction of the system's market value of total assets. The impact of extreme events is assessed using a unique set of market variables that the banks in our sample are exposed to: interbank rates, capital markets indices and government bonds yields. Also, we account for the time-varying dimension of risk.
Empirical results suggest an intensification of banks' exposure to systemic risk during the crisis period. This vulnerability is significantly and positively associated with higher long term government bonds yields and lower interbank offered rates for unsecured lending transactions.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. Section 3 presents the sample and data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
METHODOLOGY
The empirical strategy implies estimating the exposure of banks to systemic risk during distressed periods. Our approach is similar with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , but instead of estimating the contagion effects from a particular bank to the systemi, we use a top-down approach and asses the contagion effects from the whole system to a particular bank. The methodology resides in calculating the Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) indicators. VaR reflects the individual risk of a bank (i.e., the maximum possible loss at a given confidence level), while CoVaR indicates the VaR of a bank conditional on the VaR of the whole system.
Due to the dynamics of financial markets, banks' exposure to systemic risk varies in time depending on a number of factors that affect the entire banking system. To capture the variation in time of banks' exposure we estimate VaR and (j=1,5) one day lagged and εi is the error term. A detailed description of the market indices is given in section 3.
The method used to estimate eq. (1) is Quantile Regression (QR). The main advantage of this method is that it enables a more robust estimate of the tails in the presence of outliers (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) . There are different approaches for building confidence intervals. Inference within QR is more robust than within other models as the confidence intervals for different quantiles are independent of the estimators' distribution. Koenker and Bassett (1978) showed that QR estimators are similar with OLS estimators in normal distributions, but more efficient in non-normal distributions.
Applying QR method on the relationship above for the 1% quantile and 50%
quantile (the median) of the distribution of market valued asset returns ( , ) we obtain estimates of the regressors ̂ and ̂( ) . These will be further used to calculate the individual risk of banks in stressed periods (̂, ) and the individual risk of banks in normal periods (̂, (50%)):(2)
In a similar manner we determine the VaR of market value assets returns of the system (̂, ) by considering a system formed by a number of 53 banks which assets cover more than 70% for the European banking market total assets.
In addition to the market indices, banks' individual risk also varies in time in relation to the system's risk as follows:
where αi accounts for each bank's characteristics, ( ) 
Finally, we determine each bank's exposure to systemic risk as the difference between VaR of the bank conditioned on the VaR of the system in stressed periods and VaR of the bank conditioned on the VaR of the system in unstressed periods:
DATA
Our sample consists of top 10 European banks according to their total assets held at 31.12.2010. This group covers leading international banks with complex activities that are included by the supervisory authorities in the systemically important financial institutions list (BCBS, 2014; EBA, 2014). A ranking of the banks by total assets held at 31.12.2010 is given in Table 1 . Estimating the probability of a drop of the market value of total assets for each bank and also for the system implies the usage of both market prices (daily) and balance sheet variables (quarterly). Market value of total assets is calculated based on balance sheet items that capture the bank's size, capitalization and indebtedness as it gives a much clearer picture of risk exposure compared with the profitability and efficiency indicators (Zhao, 2009). The computational details are given in Table 2 . The evolution of market value of total assets for the banks in our sample is presented in Figure 1 . The descending trend of banking system assets is closely linked to a range of variables representative for financial markets. To capture the dynamic nature of systemic risk we considered the following market indices: 10-year Government Bonds Benchmark yield, CECE Banking index, STOXX America 600 index, EURO STOXX Financials index and 3-mounth Euro interbank offered rate. They are extracted from Statistical Data Warehouse of European Central Bank (ECB) and Yahoo Finance. Definitions and calculation details are given in Table 3 . The daily evolution of market indices during 2008-2011 is shown in Figure 2 while their correlation is given in Table 4 . Immediately after the Lehman Brothers collapse all indices registered a severe drop, followed by a correction started at the end of 2009. Table 3 . I  II  III IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III  2009  2010  2011   CECEBNK   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III  2009  2010  2011 Euribor 3M I  II  III IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III  2009  2010  2011   GB10Y   160   200   240   280   320   360   IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III  2009  2010  2011   SXAIE   80   120   160   200   240   280   IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III IV  I  II  III  2009 2010 2011 Note: Correlation coefficients based on daily data of market indices. The definition of market indices is given in Table 3 . Table 5 reports the empirical results corresponding to the 5% quantile regression for the daily market value assets returns of TBTF banks conditioned on the system's market value assets growth rate (lagged one day) and on the market indices (lagged one day). The estimation period range between 30.09.2008-30.09.2011.
SXFINE

RESULTS
Analyzing the empirical results it can be observed that each bank's market value assets return is significantly and positively associated with the system's market value assets return. This implies that a drop in the market value of the entire system's assets return will significantly reduce the TBTF banks' market value assets return. The greatest impact is registered for the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), followed by ING Bank NV and by Lloyds Banking Group Plc. A daily 1% drop of the system's market value assets return will result in a daily 1.65% drop of RBS market value assets return, a daily 1.60% drop of ING market value assets return and a daily 1.39% drop of Lloyds market value assets return. (1999) goodness-of-fit measure. *** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard error in (). All market indices are one day lagged. All models include an unreported constant.
Regarding the market indices, results show that 10-year Government Bonds Benchmark yield is negatively associated with TBTF banks' market value assets returns being significant for half of the banks in the sample. The finding suggests that higher long term yields raise banks' exposure to systemic events. In contrast, higher interbank offered rates for unsecured lending transactions may significantly reduce TBTF banks' exposure to systemic risk, as the coefficient associated with the 3-mounth Euro interbank offered rate is positive and significant for almost all banks in the sample. In case of the financial market indices CECE Banking index, STOXX America 600 index, EURO STOXX Financials index results are mixed. However, when significant, the coefficient is associated with a positive sign, suggesting that an upward trend of these indices is associated with a reduction of banks' exposure to systemic risk. In terms of economic significance the results are also relevant. 
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on systemic risk and "too-bigto-fail" banks. An investigation of the behavior of TBTF banks is crucial especially during crisis periods as their collapse could significantly affect the whole financial system. Also, after the Lehman Brothers collapse supervisory authorities highlighted the need of applying special prudential regulations to TBTF banks in order to limit the propagation of negative externalities to other counterparties from the system.
Motivated by this background we investigated the exposure to systemic risk of "too-big-to-fail" banks. Using a sample of top ten European banks by total assets at the debut of the most recent financial crisis we assessed the contagion effects during 2008-2011 by employing the Conditional Value at Risk methodology. Through Quantile Regression technique we estimate the probability that a bank will register a drop in its market value of total assets in stressed periods due to the reduction of the system's market value of total assets. The impact of extreme events is assessed using a unique set of market variables that the banks in our sample are exposed to: interbank rates, capital markets indices and governmental bonds yields. Also, we account for the time-varying dimension of risk.
Empirical results suggest an intensification of banks' exposure to systemic risk during the crisis period. This vulnerability is significantly and positively associated with higher long term government bonds yields and lower interbank offered rates for unsecured lending transactions. Also, a downward trend of financial market indices (CECE Banking index, STOXX America 600 index, EURO STOXX Financials index) is associated with an intensification of banks' exposure to systemic risk.
